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1 Introduction
Theory testing in the physical sciences has been revolutionized in recent decades by
Bayesian approaches to probability theory. Here, I will consider Bayesian approaches
to theory extensions, that is, theories like inflation which aim to provide a deeper expla-
nation for some aspect of our models (in this case, the standard model of cosmology)
that seem unnatural or fine-tuned. In particular, I will consider how cosmologists can
test the multiverse using observations of this universe.
Cosmologists will only ever get one horizon-full of data. Our telescopes will see so
far, and no further. At any particular time, particle accelerators reach to a finite energy
scale and no higher. And yet, it would be an unnatural constraint on our theories for
them to fall silent beyond the edge of the observable universe and above a certain
energy. Natural, simple theories need not confine themselves to the observable. How
do we speculate beyond current data?
In particular, how do we evaluate (what I will call) theory extensions? That is,
physical theories whose main attraction is that they provide a deeper, more natural
understanding of some effective theory. For example, the appeal of cosmic inflation
is its natural explanation of some of the “initial conditions” of the standard model of
cosmology. The postulates of the standard model — a homogeneous and isotropic
Robertson-Walker (RW) spacetime, a set of energy components and their densities
(matter, radiation and a cosmological constant), and an initial set of adiabatic, Gaussian
density and tensor perturbations — can explain all (or almost all) the cosmological data
at our disposal: the expansion of the universe, big bang nucleosynthesis, the angular
power spectrum of the cosmic microwave background (CMB), the galaxy and Lyman
alpha forest power spectra, the baryon acoustic oscillation (BAO) scale, the luminosity
distance-redshift relation of Type 1a supernovae, and more.
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So, why not simply declare cosmology to be finished? We have a model that
explains all the data. Consider the following kind of reason for extending our cos-
mological theory. In the standard model of cosmology, photons in the CMB that are
separated in the sky by more than ∼1 degree were scattered by patches gas that have
never been in causal contact with each other. And yet the entire CMB is at the same
temperature, to one part in 100,000. If, alternatively, we propose that there was a pe-
riod of accelerating expansion in the very early universe, then the regions we see in
the CMB have been in causal contact, allowing them to come to thermal equilibrium.
And thus, inflation solves the horizon problem, so the standard story goes.
Note well: the horizon problem does not involve a theory failing to predict an
observation. Theories never predict their initial conditions. Rather, we argue that
something about our model is open to a deeper explanation because it is unnatural,
improbable, or an unexplained coincidence.
Examples could be multiplied. General Relativity explains what to Newtonian
gravity was a bare postulate: the equivalence of inertial and gravitational mass. Su-
persymmetry doesn’t currently explain any data, but would explain why quantum cor-
rections do not drive the Higgs Boson mass to the Planck scale, a fact which would
otherwise be highly unnatural.
A calculation is required to make these arguments robust. Returning to inflation:
how probable is an isotropic CMB given inflation, and not given inflation? And how
simple is inflation as a hypothesis, given that we don’t know what the inflaton is? How
generic (probable?) are the initial conditions that lead to inflation? Observations can
tell us something about the initial conditions of the observable universe; when should
we accept a dynamical theory of those initial conditions, rather than simply postulating
them?
Can we attack these questions with probability theory at all? Cosmology promises
to stretch our interpretation of probabilities. It will be my contention here that objective
Bayesian probabilities provide a consistent framework for extrapolating cosmological
theories beyond our universe, and isolate the pertinent questions to ask of such theories.
2 Objective Bayesian Probability
2.1 Probability from Uncertainty
We will start with an (oversimplified) overview of probability, and in particular my
impressions of how it is used in the physical sciences. The interpretation of probability
has a long and surprisingly turbulent history. In one corner stands the frequentists, for
whom probabilities measure the relative frequencies of events in hypothetical infinitely
repeated trials (or, for finite frequentists, in actual, known trials). When a scientist
wants to test their ideas, they calculate the probability of the data given the theory. If
this probability (known as a likelihood) passes certain tests, then we can announce that
the theory is not disconfirmed.
The mathematical foundation of this approach was provided by Kolmogorov (1933),
who builds probability theory from mathematical axioms, independent of any partic-
ular application to statistics. Probability, like tensor calculus or conic sections, is a
tool that may or may not be useful to the scientist in the investigation of some physical
system.
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If probabilities are frequencies of outcomes, it makes no sense to ask for the prob-
ability of a theory. We cannot compare the number of universes that obey Newtonian
gravity with the number that obey Einstein’s General Relativity. This is not a criticism
of frequentism by its opponents. Ronald Fisher, the patron saint of frequentism, stated
that “we can know nothing of the probability of hypotheses or hypothetical quantities”
(Fisher, 1921).
In the other corner stands the Bayesians1. The basis of this approach is not abstract
axioms but an attempt to start from the desiderata of rationality and develop probabil-
ity theory as generalized logic. While classical logic is concerned with what follows
deductively — if A then B — probability theory will include weaker degrees of cer-
tainty — if A then probably B. Probabilities such as p(B|A) (“the probability of B
given A”) quantify the degree of certainty of the proposition B given the truth of the
proposition A. Classical logic’s implication A → B is the special case p(B|A) = 1;
those two are the same statement. The goal is not merely to quantify subjective degrees
of belief, that is, the psychological state of someone who believesA and is considering
B. Just as classical logic’s A→ B says nothing about whether A is known by anyone,
but instead denotes a connection between the truth values of the propositionsA andB,
so p(B|A) quantifies a relationship between these propositions2.
How should degrees of certainty be assigned to certain propositions? Jaynes (2003)
invites us to imagine a reasoning robot: insert a given proposition A in one slot, and
the proposition of interest B in the other slot, and out comes a number indicating the
degree of certainty. We program the robot according to the following desiderata:
D1. Probabilities are represented by real numbers. This ensures that degrees of plau-
sibility can be compared on a single scale.
D2. Probabilities change in common sense ways. For example, if learning C makes
B more likely, but doesn’t change how likely A is, then learning C should make
AB more likely.
D3. If a conclusion can be reasoned out in more than one way, then every possible
way must lead to the same result.
D4. Information must not be arbitrarily ignored. All given evidence must be taken
into account.
D5. Identical states of knowledge (except perhaps for the labeling of the proposi-
tions) should result in identical assigned probabilities.
Perhaps surprisingly, these desiderata are enough. Cox’s theorem (Jaynes (2003) and
(Caticha, 2009) are required reading) shows that quantities assigned according to these
desiderata obey the same rules as probabilities. In particular, we have a rule for each
of the Boolean operations ‘and’ (AB), ‘or’ (A+B) and ’not’ ( A¯),
p(AB|C) ≡ p(A|BC) p(B|C) ≡ p(B|AC) p(A|C) (1)
p(A+B|C) ≡ p(A|C) + p(B|C)− p(AB|C) (2)
p(A¯|C) ≡ 1− p(A|C) . (3)
1It is a simplification to speak of just two corners, but sufficient for our purposes.
2Neither are we considering degrees of truth; A and B are in fact either true or false.
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These are identities, holding for any propositions A, B and C for which the relevant
quantities are defined. In particular, from Equation (1) we can derive Bayes’ theorem,
p(A|BC) = p(B|AC) p(A|C)
p(B|C) . (4)
Bayes’s theorem often comes attached to a narrative about ‘prior’ probabilities, which
depend only on ‘known’ ‘background’ information (or worse, temporally prior infor-
mation), that is updated with new ‘data’ to produced revised ‘posterior’ probabilities.
None of this is essential to Bayesianism.
The goal of Bayesian probability theory is to calculate the probability of the propo-
sition of interest A, given everything we know K. If you are handed p(A|K) from the
clouds, then your work is done. If, however, p(A|K) is too much to handle then you’ll
have to break it into smaller pieces. In particular, the sum total of everything you
know K is likely to be expressible as a conjunction, K = BC, in which case Bayes’s
theorem is very useful. We use probability identities to write probabilities we want in
terms of probabilities we know.
2.2 The Rise of Bayesianism
A revolution in the physical sciences over the last few decades has transformed what
we do with data. New methods have been advanced because of a fundamental change
in the way that scientists view probability. From these new foundations have come a
new approach and a new set of tools, all marching under the banner of Bayes.
To underscore the dominance of Bayesian probability theory, a recent NASA As-
trophysics Data System (ADS) search of the astronomy and physics literature for arti-
cles with the word “Bayesian” or “Bayes” in the title returned 7555 papers. A search
for “frequentist” or “frequentism” in the title returned 71 papers, half of which also
have “Bayes” in the title. Most of these are comparing methods. Frequentist methods
are still used, and will not always be advertised as such. Nevertheless, this does show
how few physicists and astronomers advertise their methods as frequentist. I have
never seen frequentism defended in a scientific paper. On the rare occasions that the
word appears, it is usually as a synonym for “oversimplified” or “archaic” or “wrong”.
Why has Bayesianism risen so quickly in the physical sciences? I think that there
are two main reasons.
Firstly, Bayesianism makes good sense of theory testing. Figure 1 shows the con-
straints from data from the Planck CMB satellite (Planck Collaboration et al., 2015)
on the average cosmic density of matter, relative to the critical density. The y-axis
shows the probability (density) of a particular value of the parameter, normalized to
the maximum value.
What exactly does the y-axis quantify? It isn’t a finite or hypothetical frequency
— it’s not saying that ∼95% of universes we polled (or would hypothetically poll)
have a mass density parameter between 0.27 and 0.36. The width of the peak is not
an indication of the range of matter densities in different regions of the universe. It is
not a chance, as if the density of the universe is a stochastic property that every third
Sunday of the month is less than 0.27. The universe only has one value of its average
density, and so knows of only one point on the x-axis.
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Figure 1: Constraints from the
Planck CMB satellite on the aver-
age cosmic density of matter. The
y-axis shows the probability (den-
sity) of a particular value of the pa-
rameter, normalized to the maxi-
mum value.
The y-axis of this plot most plausibly quantifies our degree of certainty. And yet,
this is not a subjective credence. The Planck data analysis team is not reporting the
effect that their satellite’s instruments have had on their state of mind. What this plot
reports is the implications of cosmological data for the knowledge of cosmological
parameters.
More generally, science must be able to conclude, for example, that quantum me-
chanics is more likely to correctly describe atoms than classical electromagnetism.
(Otherwise, what’s the point? We’d never learn anything.) This probability must be
a statement about propositions, about states of knowledge. It cannot be a statement
about frequencies or chances, because it isn’t a statement about the universe at all,
or even a hypothetical ensemble of universes. Nature knows nothing of our incorrect
theories.
This does not mean that frequencies and chances are useless. A frequencies is a
useful way to describe data. Chances are legitimate postulates of a physical theory, for
example in describing the macroscopic state of a thermodynamic system or the indeter-
minacy of quantum systems. Bayesian probability theory does not imply that quantum
probabilities are epistemic, or that statistic mechanics needs only human ignorance
to link microphysics with thermodynamics. Rather, the claim is that frequencies and
chances are insufficient for testing theories.
Secondly, the practice of Bayesian statistics exhibits a deep clarity and unity. The
methods of orthodox statistics are a grab-bag of techniques, each intuitively reasonable
but without any deeper insight into which is the best, or even of what “best” should
mean. For example, Jaynes (2003) reports that, faced with linear regression (with
both variables subject to an error of unknown variance), the orthodox textbook of
Kempthorne & Folks (1971) formulates sixteen different methods, and, being unable
to choose between them, concludes with “It is all very difficult.” A later survey of
orthodox methods can “give only a long, somewhat dreary, list of one adhockery after
another, with no firm final conclusions.” In contrast, the Bayesian approach gives
the scientist the impression of asking the right questions of the data, with no hidden
assumptions and no black boxes.
2.3 Has Bayesianism Succeeded?
The claim of the Bayesian is that there are objective degrees of certainty or credences
that can be modelled as probabilities. They are neither frequencies (actual or hypo-
thetical), chances, nor merely subjective.
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The reader might, and probably (!) should, be skeptical as to whether such an
ambitious quantification of reasoning has indeed been achieved by the Bayesians. It
might seem like alchemy, turning the base metal of ignorance into the gold of a precise
probability distribution. Keep in mind, however, that Bayesian probabilities do not
imply statistical frequencies: it does not follow from p(B|A) = 0.5 that there is a
population of A’s that we could sample half of whose members are B’s.
Further, Bayesian probabilities do not quantify everything that A says about B.
Suppose that a mystery black box will flip a coin. What is the probability of heads
H , given this information (A)? The Bayesian has no reason to prefer one side to the
other; in particular, the coin and/or box might be biased towards one side, but we don’t
know which. To reflect this ignorance, we assign p(H|A) = 0.5. Now suppose that we
examine the coin and box, and discover that the coin is (as best we can tell) perfectly
symmetric and unbiased, and inside the box we find a mechanism that has shown no
evidence of bias in the last billion flips. What is the probability of heads H , given this
new, detailed information B? It hasn’t changed: p(H|B) = 0.5. Should the Bayesian
be worried that the probability does not reflect the vast difference in the information in
A and B? Should we seek to expand probability to take into account this difference,
using fuzzy probabilities or assigning distributions rather than numbers? Perhaps. But
the unchanged probability is in some sense the right answer. Sure, we’ve learned a lot
about the coin and the box, but this knowledge shouldn’t have changed our belief that
heads will turn up3.
The assignment of probabilities is not derailed by ignorance. Ignorance is a state of
knowledge, and probabilities describe states of knowledge. It may seem like assigning
p(H|A) = 0.5 using the principle of indifference is misleadingly precise. We should
reserve definite probability assignments for cases like B, and should instead say of A
that “I don’t know”. But this would sell ourselves short. “I don’t know which one of
these two statements is true” is a very different state of knowledge from “I don’t know
which one of these trillion statements is true”. Our probabilities can and should reflect
the size of the set of possibilities; the principle of indifference is invoked as a special
case when this size is all we have. The assigned probabilities are only misleadingly
precise if overinterpreted.
Nevertheless, Bayesian probability theory is not without worries. Some are pseudo-
problems, such as the “problem of old evidence” (Glymour, 1980)4. More troubling is
the assignment of prior probabilities. Recall that prior probabilities are simply proba-
bilities calculated using less than everything we know. So the problem is really: how
do we assign probabilities when we don’t know very much? The problem of the prior
is particularly acute when faced with a continuum of possibilities, such as a probabil-
ity distribution over a variable. We cannot say that each value is equally probable, or
that each interval in an infinite range is equally probable, since these distributions do
not sum (integrate) to one. The probabilities are worryingly shuffled by a change in
variable. How do we model ignorance of an infinite number of possibilities?
Various methods have been advanced to solve this problem, including Jeffrey’s
3It will, appropriately, change the probability that the coin is biased, given a sequence of flips. Given
A, a series of repeated heads will quickly convince us that the coin is biased. GivenB, we will resist such
a conclusion for longer, believing in the light of our examination of the coin and box that the repeated
heads are mere chance.
4Exercise for the reader. Hint: p(E|B) = 1 does not follow from “I know E”.
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prior and Jaynes et al’s Principle of Maximum Entropy. Whether these are successful
is beyond the scope of this paper, but their failure would not sink Bayesianism. It
would leave an open problem in the program. The most that the Bayesian might have to
give up in light of these worries is that probabilities can be assigned to any proposition
given any state of knowledge. For example, it seems absurd to suppose that there is
such a thing as the probability that ”the toilet paper is purple” given that ”the plate is
orange”5, that there is some number that uniquely captures the relationship between
those propositions.
Faced with infinite possibilities, or vague statements about purple toilet paper, we
might have to refrain from assigning a probability until more information is given.
Jaynes (2003) argues that the problem of infinities is similar to the problem of vague
statements — we haven’t really specified the problem until we know the limiting pro-
cedure that generates the infinity. Where one should draw the ”too vague” line, how-
ever, is not clear.
3 Extending the Laws of Nature (as we know them)
3.1 Taking Stock
We want apply Bayesian probability theory to the extension of the laws of nature, and
then in particular to the multiverse. First, we must take stock of the laws of nature as we
know them. We consider the somewhat idealized case in which we have identified the
effective laws of nature that govern the physical regimes relevant to our observational
evidence. Let,
• U = our observations of this universe.
• B = everything else we know.
• L = the laws of nature as we know them.
U represents the sum total of our observations of this universe, including every
telescope observation and every experiment. B represents everything else we know,
such that UB represents everything we know. B includes mathematical knowledge,
and in particular all of theoretical physics. A statement such as “a bound test particle
moving according to Newton’s law of gravity would obey Kepler’s laws of planetary
motion” is true even if no particles actually obey Newton’s law. It is not a statement
about the actual world.
Regarding L, I’m thinking here of the Lagrangian of the standard model of particle
physics plus general relativity, but the details won’t much matter. In a typically enter-
taining footnote, David Griffiths imagines “that God has a giant computer-controlled
factory, which takes Lagrangians as input and delivers the universe they represent as
output” (Griffiths, 2008, p. 373).
Actually, we need more than just the functional form of the Lagrangian. The equa-
tions of the laws of nature — as we know them — contain free parameters, numbers
which are not predicted by the theory itself, but without which the laws are not fully
specified. In addition, it is the solutions to the equations that describe a possible uni-
verse. We require further parameters to specify a particular universe from amongst the
5Thanks to Eric Winsberg for this example.
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family of possible universes. These are usually specified as initial conditions, or more
generally, boundary conditions.
We will represent the free parameters of the laws of nature, referred to as the con-
stants of nature, as the set of numbers αL. Similarly, we will represent the initial
conditions required to specify a solution/universe by6 βL. The subscript L is a re-
minder that it is only in the context of a particular theory that a measurement of our
universe becomes a fundamental constant.
We wish to evaluate the probability of our theory L, given the evidence we have
p(L|UB). We use Bayes’ Theorem:
p(L|UB) = p(L|B)
p(U |B) p(U |LB) . (5)
However, L is missing its parameters, and will not predict quantities until they are
specified. We can introduce the free parameters αL,βL as nuisance parameters, to be
integrated out:
p(L|UB) = p(L|B)
p(U |B)
∫
p(U |αLβLLB)p(αLβL|LB) d αL dβL . (6)
A few points to note. The first term on the top is the ‘prior’ probability of the law L,
p(L|B). This is the probability that L describes this universe, given no information
about this universe. Here is the place to formalize and implement Occam’s razor —
we expect simpler theories to be more probable (the interested reader is encouraged to
consult MacKay, 2003, Chapter 28).
The first term inside the integral (the likelihood) is where the theory, equipped
with the appropriate constants and initial conditions, shows its predictive powe by
predicting observations. The second term inside the integral is the prior probability
of the free parameters, that is, the probability of the parameters falling into a certain
range, given no information about this universe. Note that this term takes L as given
— the parameters have no law-independent meaning.
Our observations of the universe not only constrain L but its free parameters. We
can, with a slight abuse of notation7, denote by αUL and β
U
L the set of free parameters
consistent with experiment, such that,
p(αULβ
U
L |LUB) p(αULβUL |LUB) . (7)
Our goal as physicists is to identify the laws of nature that govern our observations
of the universe. Ideally, L describes our observations better than any rival theory,
p(L|UB)  p(L¯|UB), and while there exist a range of candidate deeper theories
into which L could be embedded, none is significantly preferred by our data. We do
not assume that L is the ultimate law of nature.
6The notation can be easily extended to functions or more advanced mathematical structures than lists
of numbers.
7Specifically, there are two abuses of notation. We are usingαUL and β
U
L to refer to parameter regions,
whereas before αL and βL referred to particular values. Secondly, we should be placing propositions
into our probability functions. We can think of αUL as representing the proposition “the value of the
fundamental constants of the theory L lie in the region αUL”.
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Figure 2: A Bayesian picture of a fine-tuned theory. p(U |LB) =∫
p(U |αLB) p(α|LB) dα ∼ ∆αRα  1.
3.2 Why Extend the Laws?
One particular way in which we would like a deeper physical theory to differ from
current theories is with regard to the constants of nature. In particular, we want them
gone, and we can see why from Equation (6). A sharply-peaked p(U |αLβLLB) as a
function of the free parameters (αL, βL) is precisely what physicists usually mean by
“fine-tuned” — if the theory only adequately explains the data for a very narrow range
of its free parameters, then we are suspicious. To illustrate in the one-dimensional
case (Figure 2), suppose that the prior p(α|LB) is non-zero over a range ∼ Rα, and
the likelihood p(U |αLB) is sharply peaked in a range of values ∆α, and negligible
outside. (Remembering that the prior is normalized over α, but the likelihood isn’t.)
Then when we integrate over the nuisance parameter α, p(U |LB) ∼ ∆α/Rα. Unless
the prior probability is fortuitously peaked in the same range, the likelihood p(U |LB)
will be very small.
The discovery that a theory is fine-tuned opens the door for an alternative theory
to replace it. This theory could have a broader likelihood, a narrower prior, or have no
free parameters at all. Note that a preference for such a theory is not merely aesthetic,
nor simply the desire to summarize the behaviour of nature as succinctly as possible.
3.3 How to Evaluate an Theory Extension
So, we seek an extension to the laws of nature in which fewer arbitrary constants
appear. How does the Bayesian evaluate theory extensions?
Consider, as an example, a detective entering a crime-scene. She relies on back-
ground evidence B (what she knew before she entered the room), and inside the room
she collects evidence E. The evidence clearly indicates that K, a local thug, is the
killer: p(K|EB)  p(K¯|EB). Still, there may be puzzling or suspicious aspects of
the hypothesisK; perhapsK didn’t know the victim. We thus are led to consider other
propositions; not rival theories, but extensions toK. We might wonder whetherK was
(C) contracted to kill the victim by a local mob boss. We can evaluate this extended
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hypothesis in light of the data as follows:
p(CK|EB) = p(C|KEB)p(K|EB) . (8)
Now, we suppose that C doesn’t explain the evidence of the crime-scene beyond the
hypothesis K, p(E|CKB) = p(E|KB). That is, C seeks to explain K, and K
explains E. For example, K’s fingerprints at the scene are not rendered more or less
probable by his status as a contract killer. We can then write,
p(CK|EB) = p(K|CB)
p(K|B) p(C|B)p(K|EB) . (9)
There are three factors of interest here. The first fraction denotes the probability of
K being the killer given the contract hypothesis (and B), relative to the probability
of K being the killer given background information alone. This is where the theory-
extension shows its worth, by leading us to expect that K would kill the victim. The
second term is the prior probability of C, p(C|B); the theory C is penalized if it is
implausible given the background information. Thirdly, p(K|EB) is the posterior
probability of K, which by hypothesis is close to one.
3.4 Extending the laws of nature
Consider an extension to the laws of nature. We consider a deeper theory T , which
aims to explain the laws and constants of nature as we observe them LαULβ
U
L . (For
convenience, we will write LUαβ ≡ LαULβUL to denote the whole “laws + parameters”
package.). We assume that this deeper theory does not explain the data we observe
beyond its ability to explain L, that is, p(U |TLUαβB) = p(U |LUαβB). For example,
let LUαβ be the standard model of cosmology, beginning just prior to nucleosynthesis,
and let T be inflation, which ends well before nucleosynthesis. Our prediction of
the statistical properties of the CMB needs only LUαβ; inflation does not predict the
properties of the CMB beyond predicting the “initial conditions” of the standard model
of cosmology.
The formalism is then analogous to the crime-scene case above:
p(TLUαβ|UB) =
p(LUαβ|TB)
p(LUαβ|B)
p(T |B)p(LUαβ|UB) . (10)
We can expand the fraction above,
p(TLUαβ|UB) =
p(αULβ
U
L |TLB)
p(αULβ
U
L |LB)
p(L|TB)
p(L|B) p(T |B)p(L
U
αβ|UB) . (11)
This is similar to the Bayesian formalism by which theories are tested with data, except
that we are testing the theory extension T by using the effective theory and its measured
constants LUαβ as if they were data. Equation (11) highlights three questions to ask of
any proposed extension to the laws of nature as we know them. Firstly, given the
theory T , the effective laws of nature L and background information B, how probable
are the constants and initial conditions of our universe? Secondly, given the theory
T and background information B, how probable are the effective laws of nature L?
Finally, given background information B, how probable is the theory T ?
Let’s look at some ways to do away with free parameters.
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4 Extension 1: Replace Free Parameters with Mathematical
Constants
To some, free parameters are a call to action, a hot poker in the Bayesian posterior.
We are not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until every physical measurement
can be predicted from theory alone. Einstein (1949) dreamed of a set of equations
such that “within these laws only rationally completely determined constants occur
(not constants, therefore, whose numerical value could be changed without destroying
the theory)”.
In our formalism, this theory would set p(LUαβ|TB) = 1: given the deeper theory,
there is only one low-energy effective theory with only one possible value of each
“constant”. Measuring the constants of nature would be akin to drawing a circle and
determining its radius and circumference in order to “measure” pi.
Unifying scientific theories can reduce the number of free parameters in physics.
For example, Maxwell’s unification of electricity and magnetism showed that c =
1/
√
0µ0 (c speed of light, 0 vacuum permittivity, µ0 vacuum permeability), thus
reducing the number of free parameters of physics by one. This is a step in the right
direction, but the progress of science can just as easily increase the number of constants
by, for example, discovering a new fundamental particle.
Einstein’s dream is not without its worries. A “perfect”, unity likelihood is often a
clue that the theory is ad hoc or jerry-rigged. For example, a theory with a large number
of siblings — that is, mutually exclusive but similar theories that are equally probable
given our background information — will only receive a small slice of the total prior
probability of the family. This is, in essence, why theories with free parameters are
suspicious in the first place. The theory can be thought of as a large family of theories,
one for each value of the free parameter.
Thus, we need to worry about the prior probability of our deeper theory p(T |B).
It may have no free parameters, but if it is but one member of a large set of similar
theories, the prior probability may still be small. In particular, while by hypothesis we
cannot vary the parameters of the theory, this may merely indicate that we must look
for fine-tuning at the next level deeper, as it were. Varying the effective parameters of
our laws may require varying the deeper theory, leaving us no less at the mercy of a
large set of possibilities.
This highlights one of Steven Weinberg’s wishes in “Dreams of a Final Theory”
(Weinberg, 1993), which he calls logical isolation. Weinberg argues that, while quan-
tum mechanics is not logically inevitable, “any small change in quantum mechanics
would lead to logical absurdities” (p. 70). In this sense, there is no obvious continuum
of theories, of which quantum mechanics is just one. The Bayesian argument above
fits nicely with Weinberg’s intuition. Total logical isolation, however, seems too much
to ask. Mathematical consistency is not trivial, but neither is it a rarity. There is no ul-
timate equation of our physical universe to which we can hope to say “mathematically,
that’s how things must be”.
In addition, a theory that requires no initial conditions, or that somehow predicts its
own initial conditions, would be rather strange. Rather than specifying the dynamical
properties of physical objects in the form of counterfactuals, it would specify the state
of the universe. For example, a Newtonian version of such a theory would not state that
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if two masses (m1,m2) are separated by distance r, then they would experience a force
with magnitude Gm1m2/r2. Rather, it would specify position as a function of time
r(t) for each particle in the universe. Rather than the complexity of the phenomena of
the universe giving way to simple fundamental laws, a theory with no initial conditions
would seem to require complexity all the way down.
5 Extension 2: Replace Free Parameters with Dynamical
Entities
We have expounded the ingredients of physical theories as we know them: laws, con-
stants and initial (or boundary) conditions. The laws describe dynamical entities —
fields, particles, spacetime etc. So, one way in which a constant could disappear in
a deeper theory is by changing identity to become a dynamical quantity. The fine-
structure constant, for example, could be the local value of a field. We can test this
hypothesis by looking for changes in the value of the fine-structure constant over cos-
mic time and cosmic distances. To date, no convincing variation has been found (Webb
et al., 2011; King et al., 2012; Cameron & Pettitt, 2012; Whitmore & Murphy, 2015).
Two problems immediately arise. Firstly, if the fine-structure constant is replaced
by a quantum field, then it seems that we have merely replaced one constant with
the parameters that describe the field. (In fact, a field that varies so slowly over the
observable universe requires a very low mass.) Secondly, even if we could replace
our constants with a totally constant-free field, this doesn’t seem like progress. We
have replaced a single number with a function: an infinite collection of numbers, one
attached to each spacetime point. If we are in a typical place in the universe, then
there is no further rationale for the value of the “constant” that we observe. There is
some function that varies across spacetime, and we happen to be in the part that has
α ≈ 1/137.
5.1 The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life
However, there are good reasons to believe that we are not in a typical place in the
universe. The universe is not an experiment. We are not Dr. Frankenstein, setting up
our equipment, choosing the initial conditions, and observing the setup at our leisure.
We are the monster — we have awoken in a laboratory and are trying to figure out how
it made us. Not all rooms can create a monster, so the fact that we are observing at all
is a very stringent constraint on the contents of the room.
Similarly, not all laws of nature can be scientific laws, because not all laws of nature
create scientists. There are certain equations that will not be written on a chalkboard in
any universe that they describe. If the evolution of conscious observers shows a strong
preference for certain laws or certain regions of parameter space, then an explanation
for the values of the constants naturally arises. The reason why this set of constants
exists at all is that there are a sufficiently large number of universe domains, with
enough variation in their properties that at least one of them would hit on the right
combination for life. The reason why we observe that we are in one of these rare
regions is that we couldn’t be anywhere else.
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Beginning in the 1970’s, a number of physicists have noticed the extreme sensitiv-
ity of the life-permitting qualities of our universe to the values of many of the physical
constants and cosmological parameters of our universe. Seemingly small changes in
the free parameters of the laws of nature as we know them have dramatic, uncompen-
sated and detrimental effects on the ability of the universe to support the complexity
needed by physical life forms. I have elsewhere reviewed the scientific literature on the
fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life (Barnes, 2012). Here are a few examples.
• The existence of structure in our universe at all places stringent bounds on the
cosmological constant. Compared to the range of values for which our theories
are well defined — roughly± the Planck scale — the range of values that permit
gravitationally bound structures is no more than one part in 10110.
• A universe with structure also requires a fine-tuned value for the primordial
density contrast Q. Too low, and no structure forms. Too high and galaxies
are too dense to allow for long-lived planetary systems, as the time between
disruption by a neighbouring star is too short. This places the constraint 10−6 .
Q . 10−4 (Tegmark & Rees, 1998).
• The existence of long-lived stars, which produce and distribute chemical ele-
ments and are a stable source of energy that can power chemical reactions,
requires an unnaturally small value for the “gravitational coupling constant”
αG = m
2
proton/m
2
Planck; or, equivalently, that the proton mass be orders of mag-
nitude smaller than the Planck mass. For stars to be stable at all, we require
αG . 10−33 (Adams, 2008).
• The existence of any atomic species and chemical processes whatsoever places
tight constraints on the relative masses of the fundamental particles and the
strengths of the fundamental forces. For example, Barr & Khan (2007) show
the effect of varying the masses of the up and down quark, and find that star-
and-chemistry permitting universes are huddled in a small shard of parameter
space which has area ∆mup∆mdown/m2Planck ≈ 10−42.
Note that these constraints are all multi-dimensional; I have quoted one-dimensional
bounds for simplicity. See Barnes (2012) and references therein for plots demonstrat-
ing these and more constraints in multiple dimensions of parameter space. (It is has
never been the case that the fine-tuning literature has varied one variable at a time.)
These small numbers — 10−110, 10−4, 10−33, 10−42 — are, in the Bayesian fash-
ion, an attempt to quantify our ignorance. We are not assuming the existence of a ran-
dom universe-generating machine, nor describing the properties of a real or imagined
statistical sample. The laws of nature as we know them contain arbitrary constants,
which are not constrained by anything in theoretical physics. As usual, we can react to
small probabilities in a couple of ways. Perhaps, like the probability of a deck of cards
falling on the floor in a particular order, something improbable has happened. Enough
said. Alternatively, like the probability that the burglar correctly guessed the 12-digit
code by chance on the first attempt, it may indicate that we have made an incorrect
assumption. We should look for an alternative assumption (or theory), on which the
fact in question is not so improbable.
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5.2 Making Predictions in a Multiverse
Theories are tested by their predictions, and we saw above that theory extensions are
tested by their ability to predict the effective laws and constants of nature. In practice,
this means calculating likelihoods.
The multiverse is an example of a ”population plus selection effect” explanation.
There is some observed outcome X to be explained, and X is highly improbable on
any single trial. We postulate a large, varied population to explain why any X exist
at all, and a selection effect to explain why we observe X . For example, the front
page of the newspaper reports correctly that Keith won the lottery. The probability of
any particular person winning the lottery is very small. This occurrence is made more
probable if we suppose that there are a large number of lottery players buying different
tickets, and that only a lottery win would be considered newsworthy.
Where is the relevant selection effect when we are attempting to explain the state-
ment that the effective laws of nature are L and the associated free parameters are αUL ,
βUL? Recall that U represents everything that I know about this universe. Thus, to
explain U , the proposition LαULβ
U
L must refer to this universe, the universe that I in-
habit. LαULβ
U
L cannot simply state that “there is at least one universe in which the law
L holds and in which the constants are αUL , β
U
L”, because this will not explain the fact
that I observe U .
This highlights an important difference in probability between calculating the prob-
ability that “this X is Y” and “there is at least one X that is Y”. Suppose I have just
watched Alice deal herself five Royal flushes in a row in a game of poker. The probabil-
ity of these five hands being five Royal flushes assuming a fair deal is 10−29, making
us wonder if Alice is cheating. The probability that someone, somewhere has fairly
dealt five Royal flushes depends on the number of poker deals there have ever been
anywhere in the universe. If the universe is infinite, then this probability is one, mak-
ing it useless for deciding whether Alice is cheating. As the Bayesian desiderata state,
information must not be arbitrarily ignored. Reasoning as if we only knew that “there
is at least one instance of five Royal flushes” is to discard information.
Note that the correct distinction is not between first and third person probabilities,
as is sometimes assumed in the multiverse literature. Third person probability can be
as specific (“a particular X is Y”) as first person probabilities. Also, there is nothing
“mystical” about using indexical information in probabilities (Neal, 2006); “I” can
successfully select a particular individual – in this case, the speaker of the sentence
or calculator of the probability — without assuming that the individual is unique in
reality on account of “some essence”.
So, what is the likelihood that this universe has the observed constants, given a
multiverse theory? We can calculate this in two pieces. We first calculate the probabil-
ity is that observers exist at all in the multiverse (O). So long as observer-permitting
universes have non-zero chances and the universes in the multiverse are sufficiently
varied, this probability will approach unity as the number of universes increases.
With an actual population of universes, the second probability piece is equal to a
frequency: the fraction of observers (or observer moments) that observe our particu-
lar set of constants αULβ
U
L . This will depend on two factors: the rate Robs (per unit
time and volume dxµ) at which observers/observations are made at particular point in
spacetime, given the values of the “constants”, and the probability of a particular set
14
of constants at a particular spacetime point. Considering just the constants (αL):
Nobs =
∫∫
Robs(x
µ|αLTLB) p(αL|xµTLB) dxµdαL (12)
Nobs(α
U
L ) =
∫∫
αUL
Robs(x
µ|αLTLB) p(αL|xµTLB) dxµdαL (13)
⇒ p(αUL |OTLB) =
Nobs(α
U
L )
Nobs
(14)
The fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life suggests that Robs is strongly peaked
in our neighbourhood of parameter space, meaning that while regions of the universe
with our constants are rare, they may be likely (or at least, not too unlikely) to be
observed.
However, fine-tuning for life is not enough to ensure that a multiverse success-
fully predicts our constants of nature. The form of life with which we are familiar
came about through biological evolution, via a gradual build up of complexity over
timescales that are orders of magnitude longer than the lifetime of any particular indi-
vidual. Such life forms require a stable planetary surface, a stable star producing us-
able photons, a ready supply of chemicals and so forth. However, observers could form
without this history and environment as thermodynamic fluctuations. These Boltzmann
Brains can cause problem for a multiverse theory because they mean that Robs does
not fall exactly to zero in seemingly hostile regions of parameter space.
In Equation (12), we can write Robs = Rlife +RBB to represent the contribution of
both biological life forms and Boltzmann Brains (BB) to the set of observers in a given
multiverse. Thus, we can also write Nobs = Nlife +NBB. We have, then, a competition
between whether most observers (or observations) are made by common observers in
rare conditions (life) or rare observers in common conditions (BB).
In testing a multiverse, it matters what other hypothetical observers in the multi-
verse observe, since the likelihood is normalized over αL. Theories must place their
bets as to what data are to be expected; for the multiverse, this means predicting what
an observer will observe. While our calculation of the posterior involves evaluating the
likelihood at our particular value of the constants in our universe, the normalization of
the likelihood means that the more observers there are that do not observe what we
observe, the smaller the likelihood. Every observer counts, not just those who observe
exactly what we observe.
Figure 3 presents a 1D illustration of this Boltzmann observer problem. The prob-
lem is not that we might be Boltzmann Brains, or that most entities with my memories
are fluctuation observers. We can call that the Boltzmann Me problem, and set it to one
side. The Boltzmann observer problem is a straightforward case of a failed prediction.
A multiverse, once the full range of observers is considered, can be strongly discon-
firmed by the seemingly innocuous observation that I am not a brain floating in empty
space. The problem is not that we might be Boltzmann brains; the problem (for the
theory) is that we aren’t.
Testing the multiverse thus requires an understanding of the conditions under which
observers can fluctuate into existence. It is of particular interest whether quantum fluc-
tuations in a vacuum can create observers; see Boddy et al. (2014) for the case against
such observers. In broadly thermodynamic terms, the Boltzmann Observer problem
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Figure 3: An illustration of the Boltzmann observer problem. The likelihood of the
set of constants that we observe given a multiverse theory p(αL|OTLB) is normalised
over αL. In evaluating the posterior probability of the multiverse, we evaluate the
likelihood at the observed value of the constant αobs. Boltzmann brains can exist in
universes which are hostile to biological life forms, and so can be found in a much
larger region of parameter space. The larger the area under the broader Boltzmann
Brain contribution, the smaller the (renormalized) likelihood of a biological life form
observing αobs.
seems formidable. Biological life requires low entropy conditions in a large region; in
fact, the entropy of this universe seems to be far lower than is required even by biologi-
cal life forms (Eddington, 1931; Penrose, 2004). Boltzmann Brains, on the other hand,
require only the smallest entropy fluctuation needed to create an observer. Given the
usual connection between low entropy conditions and improbability, this would seem
to make Boltzmann Brains far more numerous than biological life forms.
We also face the measure problem, which in our formalism is the question of how
to evaluate the likelihood of a multiverse theory when the number of observers is in-
finite. Jaynes (2003, p. 486-7) warns that “attempts to apply the rules of probability
theory directly and indiscriminately on infinite sets” leads to paradoxes, and that the
only cure for this disease is that “an infinite set should be thought of only as the limit
of a specific (i.e. unambiguously specified) sequence of finite sets. . . . The mathe-
matically generated paradoxes have been found only when we tried to depart from
this policy by treating an infinite limit as something already accomplished, without
regard to any limiting operation.” The problem for an infinite multiverse is that there
is no such limit — the infinity in question is “completed”, an actually infinite set of
universes and observers. In such circumstances, our probability assignments cannot be
invariant under permutations of the labels on the observers (Olum, 2012). Infinite mul-
tiverse modellers could try to manufacture a limiting process — perhaps a sequence of
spacetime volumes — or justify restricting attention to a finite subset.
5.3 Typicality and the Multiverse
Testing the multiverse has often focused on typicality: a theory is to be preferred if it
predicts that human observers are typical in some class of objects in the universe (Har-
tle & Srednicki, 2007). For example, suppose we derive from a multiverse theory T
the distribution of observed values of some constant α: p(α|TB). T predicts that, with
95% certainty, our observed value of α falls inside the central 95% of the distribution.
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If this prediction is correct, then the theory has passed this test.
This type of reasoning is transparently frequentist: the only probabilities that we
can define are those of data with respect to theory, so we test theories by inventing a
test for the likelihood. Should it pass, we try to think of another test, or else get more
data. It ignores prior probabilities, and so cannot calculate the probability of a theory
given the evidence.
As with other frequentists methods, we can use Bayesian probability theory to
expose the hidden assumptions. When is typicality — defined as closeness to the
likelihood peak — a useful discriminant between models? Consider the simple case
of two theories T1 and T2 competing to predict the value of some constant α. We
calculate the likelihood distribution for α on each theory p(α|TB); suppose that it is
roughly Gaussian. If a) the prior probabilities of T1 and T2 are similar and, b) if the
widths of the likelihood distributions p(α|T1B) and p(α|T2B) are similar, then the
theory for which the observed value of α lies closest to the peak of the distribution has
the greater posterior probability.
Note that both conditions a) and b) are needed, and thus typicality is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for a multiverse theory to be a good theory. The
problem with typicality is that it compares values of the likelihood at different values
of α, when we should be comparing different theories by evaluating their likelihoods
at the observed value of α.
Let’s be clear of the status of typicality. It is not an assumption to be accepted
or rejected at our leisure. It is not an assumption at all. Under certain conditions,
it is useful rule of thumb in evaluating competing multiverse theories. Bayesianism
identifies these conditions.
6 Extension 3: Getting Metaphysical
At this conference, George Ellis has invited us to think about not only cosmology
with a small ‘c’, defined as the the physics of the universe on large scales, but also
Cosmology with a capital ‘C’, which asks the great questions of existence, meaning
and purpose that are raised by physical cosmology. Nothing in our formalism assumes
that T is a physical theory. Indeed, if there is a final, ultimate physical theory of nature
F , then whatever we think about that theory will have to be deeper than physics, so to
speak. Even if all that remains is to state the definition of naturalism, that nothing other
than the physical exists, we must acknowledge that this is a statement about physics,
not of physics.
Further,we want to know whether or not naturalism is true. We can treat naturalism
like any other theory, and consider its prior probability p(N |B), and the probability
of the final scientific laws on naturalism p(F |NB). Even if we can’t calculate these
quantities, they point to the right questions to ask. Naturalism, as a hypothesis, is what
statisticians call non-informative — it gives us no reason to prefer any particular F . In
the case of naturalism, this is an in principle ignorance, since by hypothesis there are
no true facts that explain why F rather than some other final law, why any law at all,
why a mathematical law, what “breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe
for them to describe?” (Hawking, 1988), what is existence, and so on.
Non-informative theories have likelihoods that are at the mercy of the size of their
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possibility space. For example, “the burglar guessed the 12-digit security code” gives
us no reason to prefer any code over any other, and thus the likelihood of any partic-
ular code should reflect these trillion possibilities. The only thing in our background
knowledge B that restricts the set of possible universes is internal (mathematical) con-
sistency. Naturalism, then, is at the mercy of every possible way that concrete reality
could consistently be. This places naturalism in an unenviable position.
Its competitors to explain F include axiarchism (Leslie, 1989) and theism (Swin-
burne, 2004), which argue that we should expect the existence of physical reality with
significant moral value, including the moral good of embodied, free, conscious moral
agents. Axiarchism and theism, then, bet heavily on the subset of possible laws that
permit the existence of such life forms. Whether the fine-tuning of the laws as we
know them (LUαβ) for life extends to final laws F , and their relative prior probabilities,
will decide whether any of these theories is preferable to naturalism.
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